William of Ockham

English

Therefore I say otherwise to the question. And first I show that someone can be accepted and dear to God without any supernatural form inhering in him. Second, that whatever supernatural form has been placed in the soul, the soul can still be not accepted by God.

But first I set out what I understand by being accepted and dear to God. And I say that he is accepted and dear to God who, being in such a state, will — unless he offends by sin — be disposed by God to eternal life. As with a baptised child: for he is then in such a state of soul that unless he afterwards sins mortally, God will give him eternal life. It is not so with him before baptism: for whether he afterwards sins or not, unless he is baptised with some baptism he will not have eternal life.

This being supposed, I prove the first conclusion. Whoever can have a meritorious act without such an inhering supernatural form can be accepted by God without such an inhering supernatural form; but someone, by God's absolute power, can have a meritorious act without such a form; therefore, and so on. The major is plain. I prove the minor: whenever there are several acts in someone's power, neither of which is of its own nature worthy of eternal life, if both are simply good and have no bad circumstance, then by whatever reasoning one of them can be meritorious of eternal life, so can the other, by God's absolute power. But an act with such a supernatural form and an act of loving God above all things stand thus: neither is of its own nature meritorious of eternal life, but only because God accepts it contingently. Therefore by whatever reasoning one of them can be meritorious of eternal life, so can the other, by God's absolute power. […]

Therefore I say that for the soul to be pleasing and accepted by God, by God's absolute power, no supernatural form is required in the soul; and whatever form has been placed in it, God can by his absolute power not accept it. So that he always beatifies anyone contingently and freely and mercifully and out of his own grace; so that out of purely natural powers no one can merit eternal life, nor even out of any gifts at all conferred by God, except because God has contingently and freely and mercifully ordained that one having such gifts can merit eternal life; so that God can be necessitated by no thing whatever to confer eternal life on anyone.

And so this opinion of my own departs as far as possible from the error of Pelagius. For Pelagius himself held that if someone has an act good in its kind, God is necessitated to confer eternal life on him, and not purely out of his own grace — so that he would necessarily be unjust if he did not grant him eternal life. But the aforesaid opinion, although it does not hold that an act elicited out of purely natural powers necessitates God in this way, does hold that some supernatural form created by God necessitates God: for it has to hold that it involves a contradiction that such a form should be in the soul and that God should never give that soul eternal life.

I, however, hold that no form, neither natural nor supernatural, can necessitate God in this way — such that it would not involve a contradiction that such a form […]

Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.

Latin

William of Ockham, Ordinatio I d.17 q.1, in Quaestiones et decisiones in IV libros Sententiarum, Lyon: Johannes Trechsel, 1495, leaf n376 (archive.org A336059) · pd

Notes

The first witness on this page that does not answer the Master's question in the Master's terms. Ockham does not say charity is the Spirit, and he does not deny the created habit; he denies that any created thing can make God accept a soul, because God accepts contingenter et libere et misericorditer and cannot be necessitated. The question shifts from what charity IS to what it can DO. Rostered here as the determination only (n376): the question, the principal argument and the opinio prima that he is answering stand on n373 and are not part of this continuous argument; the elisions marked […] are the proof of the second conclusion and the sentence he is in the middle of at the column's foot. ⭐ The word maxime, at 'ista propria opinio maxime recedit ab errore Pelagii', first read as the non-word 'marie' at the 1495 scan's resolution ceiling by two readers independently; it was settled not by magnification but by Biel, who quotes the sentence in roman type. In this fount the x has a descending tail all but identical to the r-rotunda (~/paleography/research/letterform-confusions.md).

Threads

• ← contests · John Capreolus
  The two theses are exact contradictories on the same question. Capreolus: actus meritorius necessario requirit gratiam creatam in anima eliciente vel producente huiusmodi actum. Ockham: ad hoc quod anima sit grata et accepta deo de potentia dei absoluta, nulla forma supernaturalis requiritur in anima. ⚠ Capreolus does not name Ockham anywhere in d.17 — the opponents he names are Gregory and Scotus — so this edge is drawn between the positions, not on a citation.
• ← echoes · Gabriel Biel
  Biel's third conclusion is Ockham's second, in Ockham's terms. Ockham: quacumque forma posita supernaturali in anima potest ipsa esse non accepta deo. Biel: quacunque forma supernaturali in anima posita, potest deus eam non acceptare ad vitam eternam — and he closes with Ockham's own adverb, deus quemcunque beatificat mere contingenter. The proof is his own: Enoch and Elijah, believed to have grace, kept in paradise without the beatific vision.
• → contests · Gregory of Rimini
  Both texts make Pelagius the decisive charge on this question, from opposite directions. Gregory's page: qua ratione aliquis posset sic esse carus sine habitu charitatis supernaturaliter infuso, eadem ratione posset esse carus sine omni habitu supernaturali, et per consequens ex solis naturalibus posset esse dignus vita eterna: qui fuit error Pelagii — which describes Ockham's thesis. Ockham: et sic ista propria opinio maxime recedit ab errore Pelagii, because on his account it is the created form, necessitating God, that repeats what Pelagius did with the natural act. Neither cites the other. ⚠ The qualification belongs on the wire, not in a footnote: the Pelagius sentence stands in Gregory's OPENING ARGUMENT (Et arguitur quod non … Confirmatur …), before Ad oppositum est Magister in littera — it is not his determination. He accepts that argument's conclusion only de potentia ordinata, which is the whole of his article 1 and the whole of what is read here. His article 2 asks the absolute-power question, and Capreolus, quoting it by reference (1 Sentent., dist. 17, q. 1, art. 2), reports him arguing the other way: possibile est aliquem, de potentia Dei absoluta, esse Deo charum et acceptum, non habendo charitatem habitualem creatam. On Ockham's own question these two may not be opposed at all. See crux 4.
• ← echoes · Gabriel Biel
  Biel takes Ockham's question almost verbatim, differing in one word — Ockham: Utrum propter spiritum sanctum necesse sit ponere charitatem absolutam creatam animam formaliter informantem; Biel: Utrum praeter Spiritum sanctum necesse sit ponere charitatem absolutam creatam animam formaliter informantem — and reproduces Ockham's definition of being dear to God with the same baptised-infant example, adding only the adult in mortal sin. He also carries over Ockham's Pelagius sentence and its marginal rubric: Et hoc dictum maxime recedit ab errore Pelagij. Verbatim reuse without a name at this point, so echoes; but Biel names Ockham three leaves on (Vide ad idem Ockam in centilogio, in conclusione xij.), so the reuse is not anonymous.