Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum I d.17 q.1, third conclusion, in Commentarij doctissimi in 4. Sententiarum libros, Brescia: Petrus Bozola, 1574, p. 202, leaf n297 (archive.org bub_gb_BBOVAlqWQBUC)
Third conclusion. Whatever supernatural form has been placed in the soul, God can decline to accept that soul unto eternal life.
It is proved: because, whatever form has been placed there, God is not necessitated to produce anything else without which that form can stand and be conserved; therefore, once that habit has been posited, God can still not beatify.
Again, whatever form God can produce and conserve for a time without another, he can conserve perpetually without it. Again, he can annihilate that form together with the soul in which it inheres. Again, who doubts that he could keep Enoch and Elijah perpetually in paradise without the beatific vision and enjoyment — who are nevertheless believed to have grace?
From which it follows that God beatifies anyone he beatifies purely conting⟨ently⟩ […]
Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.
Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum I d.17 q.1, third conclusion, in Commentarij doctissimi in 4. Sententiarum libros, Brescia: Petrus Bozola, 1574, p. 202, leaf n297 (archive.org bub_gb_BBOVAlqWQBUC) · pd
Ockham's second conclusion, restated by his epitomator seventy years on and given an argument Ockham does not use: Enoch and Elijah, who are believed to have grace and are held in paradise without the beatific vision. A scriptural case for a metaphysical thesis, and the one place on this page where the absolute-power argument touches anything a reader could picture. His conclusion, deus quemcunque beatificat mere contingenter, is Ockham's word.