John Capreolus
Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Paban–Pègues, Tours 1900, vol. 2, Dist. XVII q.1
Datec. 1426PlaceToulouseBench / bandthomistDistinctionI d.17 · cap. 1–6 · q.1
English
Concerning the seventeenth distinction it is asked: whether charity is some habit created in the soul.
And it is argued that it is not. No creature is worthier than the soul of Christ; but charity is worthier than the soul of Christ, since it is by charity itself that the soul of Christ is worthy and good; therefore charity is not a creature.
On the opposite side it is argued through Augustine, who, in book 3 of On Christian Doctrine (chapter 10), says: 'By charity I mean the motion of the soul towards enjoying God for his own sake'; but a motion of the soul is something created in the soul; therefore charity is something created in the soul.
In this question there will be two articles. In the first, conclusions will be set out. In the second, doubts.
Article I. Conclusions are set out. As to the first, let this be the first conclusion: that the motion of charity necessarily requires some habitual form in us, superadded to the natural power.
This conclusion is proved thus, following Saint Thomas, Summa II-II, q. 23, art. 2, where he argues in this way: «If the motion of charity so proceeds from the Holy Spirit moving the human mind that the human mind is only moved and is in no way the principle of this motion, as when some body is moved by some exterior mover, in no way will that motion be voluntary. For this is against the character of the voluntary, whose principle must be in the thing itself. Whence it would follow that to love would not be voluntary; which implies a contradiction […]»
Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.
Latin
Circa decimamseptimam distinctionem quaeritur: Utrum charitas sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima.
Et arguitur quod non. Nulla creatura est dignior anima Christi; sed charitas est dignior anima Christi, quia ipsa charitate anima Christi digna est et bona; ergo charitas non est creatura.
In oppositum arguitur per Augustinum, qui, 3. de Doctrina christiana (cap. 10), dicit: Charitatem voco animi motum ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum; sed motus animi est aliquid creatum in anima; ergo charitas est quid creatum in anima.
In hac quaestione erunt duo articuli. In primo ponentur conclusiones. In secundo dubitationes.
Articulus I. Ponuntur conclusiones. Quantum ad primum, sit prima conclusio: quod motus charitatis necessario requirit formam aliquam habitualem in nobis, superadditam potentiae naturali.
Probatur sic ista conclusio, secundum sanctum Thomam, 2a 2ae, q. 23, art. 2, ubi sic arguit: «Si motus charitatis ita procedit a Spiritu Sancto movente humanam mentem, quod mens humana sit tantummodo mota et nullo modo sit principium hujus motus, sicut cum aliquod corpus movetur ab aliquo exteriori movente, nullo modo ille motus erit voluntarius. Hoc enim est contra rationem voluntarii, cujus oportet principium in ipso esse. Unde sequeretur quod diligere non esset voluntarium; quod implicat contradictionem […]»
Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Paban–Pègues, Tours 1900, vol. 2, Dist. XVII q.1 · pd
Notes
A hundred and seventy years after Thomas, the question is put in the same words and the answer is no longer argued but defended. Capreolus's own contribution is the framing and the first conclusion; his proof is a long quotation of Thomas, which is elided here at […] because that text is on this page as its own witness. A text may be found through Capreolus and never cited through him. His copy of the Summa reads mens humana sit tantummodo mota where the Leonine has humana mens sit mota tantum — a small variant, left as he has it, since what he read is the evidence. Latin restored from the 1900 print's OCR: repair of scanning damage, not expansion of abbreviation.
A created habit
Threads
- → transmits · Thomas Aquinas
What happened to the thesis, in the shape of the argument rather than in anything anyone says about it. A hundred and seventy years after the Summa the question is still put in Bonaventure's words, and Capreolus answers it by quoting Thomas at length: Probatur sic ista conclusio, secundum sanctum Thomam, 2a 2ae, q. 23, art. 2, ubi sic arguit. The disputed question has become a citation, and this article is what it cites. - → transmits · Thomas Aquinas
Capreolus proves his first conclusion by quoting this article: Probatur sic ista conclusio, secundum sanctum Thomam, 2a 2ae, q. 23, art. 2, ubi sic arguit. The quotation runs on for most of a column. His copy reads mens humana sit tantummodo mota where the Leonine has humana mens sit mota tantum. - → parallel · Bonaventure
The two benches put the question in almost the same words a century and a half apart. Bonaventure: Utrum praeter caritatem increatam poni debeat habitus caritatis creatus. Capreolus: Utrum charitas sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima. Their opening objection is also the same one — that no creature is worthier than the soul of Christ, yet charity is — and neither cites the other for it. - ← contests · Peter Auriol
Capreolus prints these four arguments under the heading Argumenta Aureoli, directed principaliter contra aliqua dicta in probatione primae conclusionis — that is, against the proof of the very conclusion this page carries as his own note, quod charitas est aliquis habitus creatus in anima. The dependency runs both ways on one page: the note that contests is also the note that reports it.