Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Paban–Pègues, Tours 1900, vol. 2, p. 74, Dist. XVII q.1 art.2, Argumenta Aureoli contra primam conclusionem — reporting Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum in I Sent., d.17 q.1 art.3
Reported. These are not Peter Auriol's own words. The Latin below is John Capreolus's report of him — staged as Argumenta Aureoli contra primam conclusionem, before Capreolus answers it. It is evidence for what John Capreolus wrote about Peter Auriol, and never for what Peter Auriol wrote.
As to the second article Auriol appears to argue, and chiefly against certain things said in the proof of the first conclusion. And in the first place, in this same distinction (q. 1, art. 3).
First, thus: This opinion, he says, does not appear to demonstrate that charity is necessary over and above the other natural habits. […] For to love God above all things, and above oneself, and with the whole of one's effort and out of the whole of one's strength, is to have the substance of charitable love. But according to these men — Ia IIae, q. 109, art. 3 — a man constituted in his purely natural powers can love God above himself and above all things, and an angel likewise can do the same. Therefore the will has a sufficient principle within itself, without any habit supernaturally superadded; therefore it is capable of the substance of charitable love. Hence there does appear to be a contradiction between these two propositions: the first, that the will is not a sufficient principle of the act of love unless some supernatural habit be superadded; the second, that out of its purely natural powers it can love God above itself and above all things — unless perhaps it be said that he can be loved more than above oneself and above all things, or that the love of charity is inferior to the natural love.
Second, thus. Whoever experiences in himself an act of which he is not naturally capable, experiences that he has some active principle superadded to his nature. But no one existing in charity, and loving God charitably, can know by experience that there is in him a supernatural principle which is charity; otherwise a man could know whether he were worthy of hatred or of love, against the determination of Scripture (Eccles. 9:1). Therefore he experiences no supernatural act in himself.
Third, thus. So great is the freedom of the will, at least of an angel's, that it is capable of every act of will, under all the circumstances under which an act of this kind can be presented to it by the intellect; otherwise the intellect could dictate more than the will could choose, the opposite of which we experience. But every act which we experience, right reason can dictate — to love God most intensely above all things, for instance. Therefore it does not appear why such an act should be above the natural capacity of the power of the will.
Fourth, thus. It does not appear true that the habit of charity makes the act delightful, and makes the will operate with delight. For a man newly converted and newly confessed does not experience this. And if, charity existing in the will, a man did experience delight of this kind, he would know at once when he began to be in charity — the opposite of which the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 4:4, when he says: I am conscious of nothing against myself, but I am not thereby justified; giving it to be understood that a man cannot judge when he is accepted by God. Therefore charity is not required for the sake of delight in the act. — Thus he.
Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.
Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, ed. Paban–Pègues, Tours 1900, vol. 2, p. 74, Dist. XVII q.1 art.2, Argumenta Aureoli contra primam conclusionem — reporting Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum in I Sent., d.17 q.1 art.3 · pd
⛔ The words under Auriol's name here are not his. They are Capreolus's report of him, and they are on this page under the reported rule (RULINGS.md ruling 8), which is the declared inverse of the via rule: a text may be found through Capreolus and never cited through him — unless the note says on its face that it is being cited through him, as this one does. ⭐ The reason to accept the mediation here is not convenience. Auriol's own text on this question, d.17 q.1 art.3, has been edited on the Electronic Scriptum and never published, and no early print carries it; a rule refusing report would not keep this edition purer, it would keep Auriol off the page. What he argues is unlike anything else on the page: not that a created charity is impossible or that it necessitates God, but that the Thomist case for one is undemonstrated, and undemonstrated on Thomist premises — if a man in his purely natural powers can love God above all things, as Ia IIae q.109 a.3 allows, then he already has the substance of charitable love without any superadded habit. His second argument is the sharpest thing in the edition: nobody in charity can tell by experience that he is, or Ecclesiastes 9:1 would be false. ⚠ One sentence is elided at […] where the 1900 OCR of p. 74 is unreadable; the elision is scanner damage, not editorial choice.