Sententiae

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis I d.17 q.1 a.1 (Parma vol. VI, 1856, archive.org sanctithomaeaqu06thom; text located via Corpus Thomisticum)

Datec. 1254PlaceParisBench / bandthomistDistinctionI d.17 · cap. 1–6 · q.1 a.1
Spirit or habit

English

To the first the procedure is as follows. It seems that charity is not something created in the soul. For an agent which works without a medium is more perfect than one which acts only through a medium. But the Holy Spirit works in us both the willing and the accomplishing in meritorious acts, according to the Apostle: 'For whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God' (Romans 8:14). Therefore, since he is the most perfect agent, it seems that he does not move us to this working through any created habit as a medium.

Likewise, as the soul stands to the body as its life, so God stands to the soul, as Augustine says. But the soul does not quicken the body through any intermediate form. Therefore neither does the Holy Spirit quicken the soul through an intermediate habit.

Further, the being of grace is more immediately and more nearly from God than the being of nature. But God used no medium in creation, when he instituted nature. Therefore neither does he in re-creation, when he infuses grace.

This is shown also from the dignity of charity. For every creature is vanity. If therefore charity is a creature, it will be vanity. But vanity does not join to truth, nor confirm in truth. Therefore charity would not join us to God; which is false.

Further, nothing finite is of infinite power, since power flows from essence. But every creature is finite. Therefore the power of no creature is infinite. But the power of charity is infinite, because it moves across an infinite distance: for it joins the creature to the Creator, and makes the sinner just. Therefore it seems that it is not a creature.

Likewise, no creature is worthier than the soul of Christ. But charity is worthier than the soul of Christ, since it is by charity itself that the soul of Christ is good. Therefore charity is not a creature.

Further, to a greater good a greater love is owed. But God is an infinite good, and has done infinite things for us. Therefore we owe him infinite love. But the love by which we love God is charity. Therefore charity is something infinite. Therefore it is not a creature.

Further, everything created is in some predicament. But whatever is contained in the ten genera is some nature. If therefore charity is something created, it will be a certain nature. But a nature coming to a nature makes nothing but a nature. Therefore the soul having charity, if charity is something created, will have nothing but the being of nature. But through charity it can merit. Therefore some nature will be able of itself to reach meritorious acts; which is the Pelagian heresy. It seems therefore that charity is not something created.

On the contrary: everything that is received in something is received in it after the manner of the receiver. But uncreated love, which is the Holy Spirit, is participated in the creature. Therefore it is participated according to the manner of that creature. But its manner is finite. Therefore it is necessary that some finite love be received in the creature. But everything finite is created. Therefore in the soul having the Holy Spirit there is some created charity.

Likewise, every assimilation comes about through some form. But through charity we are made conformed to God himself; and when it is lost, the soul is said to be deformed. Therefore it seems that charity is a certain created form remaining in the soul.

Further, it is established that God is in the saints in some manner in which he is not in other creatures. But this difference cannot be placed on the side of God himself, who stands in the same way towards all things. Therefore it seems that it is on the side of the creature — namely, that the creature itself has something which others do not have. Either then it has the divine being itself, and thus all the just would be taken up by the Holy Spirit into unity of person, as human nature was taken up by Christ into unity of the person of the Son of God: which cannot be. Or it is necessary that that creature, in which God is said to be in a special manner, have in itself some effect of God which others do not have. But this effect cannot be an act only; because in that case, in the just who are asleep, he would be there in no other manner than in other creatures. Therefore it is necessary that it be some habit. It is necessary therefore that some created habit of charity be in the soul, according to which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell it.

I answer that the whole goodness of the soul itself is from charity: whence it has as much of charity as it is good, and if it does not have charity, it is nothing, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13. But it is established that through charity the soul does not have less of goodness in the being of grace than it has through an acquired virtue in political being. Now political virtue does two things: it makes the one having it good, and it renders his work good. Much more strongly, therefore, does charity do this. But neither of these can be brought about unless charity is a created habit. For it is established that all being comes from some inhering form, as being white comes from whiteness, and substantial being from substantial form. Just as therefore it cannot be understood that a wall is white without inhering whiteness, so it cannot be understood that the soul is good in gratuitous being without charity and grace informing it. Likewise also, since an act is proportioned to the operative power as an effect to its proper cause, it is impossible to understand that an act perfect in goodness should come from a power not perfected by a habit; just as heating cannot come from fire except through the medium of heat. And therefore, since the act of charity has a certain perfection from the fact that it is meritorious in every way, it is necessary to posit that charity is a created habit in the soul — which indeed is efficiently from the whole Trinity, but flows exemplarily from Love, who is the Holy Spirit. And therefore it is frequently found that the Holy Spirit is the love by which we love God and neighbour, just as it is also said by Dionysius that the divine being is the being of all things, namely inasmuch as all being is exemplarily drawn from him. The Master, however, holds that charity is not any created habit in the soul, but that it is only an act which comes from free choice moved by the Holy Spirit, whom he calls charity. For the explaining of which, certain men have said that, just as light can be considered in two ways — either as it is in itself, and so it is called light, or as it is at the boundary of a bounded transparent body, and so light is called colour (since the hypostasis of colour is light, and colour is nothing other than embodied light) — so they say that the Holy Spirit, as he is considered in himself, is called the Holy Spirit and God; but as he is considered as existing in the soul, which he moves to the act of charity, he is called charity. For they say that, just as the Son alone united human nature to himself, although the working of the whole Trinity is there, so the Holy Spirit alone unites the will to himself, although the working of the whole Trinity is there. But this cannot stand; because the union of human nature in Christ is terminated at the one being of a divine person, and therefore the numerically same act belongs to the divine person and to the assumed human nature. But the will of some saint is not taken up into the unity of the supposit of the Holy Spirit. Whence, since a working has its unity and diversity from the supposit, it cannot be that one working of the will and of the Holy Spirit be understood, except in the manner in which God works in any thing whatever. But that manner does not suffice for the perfection of the working; because a working follows the conditions of the proximate cause in necessity and contingency and perfection and the like, and not those of the first cause. Whence there is no understanding that there is a perfect working of the will through which it is united to the Holy Spirit, unless there is there a habit perfecting the operative power: nor can there be a likeness of the act of the will to the Holy Spirit, unless there is a likeness of the Holy Spirit in the soul through some form, which is the principle of the act by which it is conformed to the Holy Spirit; because the act does not suffice for this, as has been said.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that in the making-pleasing of the soul there is a twofold working of the Holy Spirit to consider. One, which is terminated at being according to first act, which is being pleasing in having the habit of charity. The other, according to which he works the second act, which is the working that moves the will to the work of love: and in both ways a medium must fall in, not on account of any need or defect in the Spirit who works, but on account of the necessity of the soul which receives — though differently. For as to the first effect, which is the being of grace, charity is a medium after the manner of a formal cause: because no being can be received in a creature except through some form. But as to the second effect, which is the working, charity is a medium in the character of an efficient cause, according as we lead back the power which is the principle of working into the agent cause: because neither is it possible that any perfect working should come out from a creature, unless the principle of that working be a perfection of the working power, as we say that the habit eliciting the act is its principle.

To the second it must be said that the soul is compared to the body not only as an acting cause, according as it is the mover of the body, but also as a form; whence it formally makes the body live by itself, according as to live is said to be the being of living things. But God is not the form of the soul itself or of the will, by which it could formally live; but he is called the life of the soul as the principle exemplarily flowing the life of grace into it. Likewise it must be said of light, that light can be considered in two ways. Either as it is in the luminous body itself, and thus it stands to the illumination of the air as an efficient principle, and does not illuminate except through the form of light flowed into the transparent body illuminated; or as it is in the illuminated transparent body, and thus it is its form, by which it is formally luminous. But God is called the illuminating light after the manner of the light which is in the shining body of itself, and not after the manner in which the illuminated is formally illuminated by the form of light received in it. But charity or grace received in the soul is likened to that received light.

To the third it must be said that creation and re-creation are altogether alike. For just as God by creation conferred on things the being of nature, and that being is formally from the form received in the created thing itself, which is as it were the term of the working of the agent; and again that form is the principle of the natural workings which God works in things: so also in re-creation God confers on the soul the being of grace, and the formal principle of that being is a created habit, by which also the meritorious working which God works in us is perfected; and thus this created habit stands partly to the working of the Holy Spirit as a term, and partly as a medium.

To the fourth it must be said that charity, inasmuch as it is from nothing, has it that it is vanity; but inasmuch as it proceeds from God as a likeness of him, it does not have the character of vanity, but rather of joining to God himself.

To the fifth it must be said that something is said to make in two ways: either after the manner of an efficient cause, as a painter makes a wall white; or after the manner of a form, as whiteness makes it white. To make a just man out of a sinner, then, or one joined to God, belongs to God himself as efficient, and to charity itself as form. Whence it cannot be concluded that charity is of infinite power, but only that it is the effect of an infinite power.

To the sixth it must be said that the nobility of things can be regarded in two ways: either simply, or in a certain respect. Now that seems simply worthier which is nobler according to its being, and in this way the soul of Christ and the soul of any just man is nobler than created charity, which has the being of an accident. Something also seems worthier in a certain respect, which is worthier according to something; and in this way created charity is nobler than the soul of Christ. For in any genus the act is nobler than the potency, as regards that genus. Whence, just as the whiteness of Christ's body, as regards that being which is being white, is nobler than the body of Christ is; so also his created knowledge is nobler than his soul as regards this, that it is being knowing, which is being in a certain respect. And likewise charity as regards such being: because in that being it stands to the soul of Christ as act to potency.

To the seventh it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, in certain friendships it never happens that an equivalent is returned: but for the fairness of the friendship what is possible to be returned suffices; just as a son can never return to his bodily father anything equivalent to what he received from him, namely being and teaching and nourishment. Much less can we return love equivalent to the divine benefits and to his goodness. Whence it does not follow that the love by which we love God is infinite as regards the substance of the act; but it has infinity from this, that the object of the love is set before all others: but it suffices that we love with a love commensurate to ourselves.

To the last it must be said that nature is said in many ways, according to Boethius. For in one way nature is said of everything that is, whether substance or accident; and in this way grace is a certain nature. In another way nature is said to be the principle of motion and rest in that in which it is, whence that is called natural which either is caused by natural principles or can be so caused; and in this way charity is not a nature, because it cannot be caused through the natural principles of a creature. And it is according to this manner that Pelagius says that a man can reach meritorious acts by natural things alone.

Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.

Latin

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. Agens enim quod sine medio operatur perfectius est quam illud quod non agit nisi per medium. Sed spiritus sanctus operatur in nobis velle et perficere in actibus meritoriis, secundum apostolum: qui enim spiritu Dei aguntur hi filii Dei sunt, Roman. 8, 14. Ergo cum ipse sit perfectissimum agens, videtur quod non moveat ad hanc operationem per aliquem habitum creatum medium.

Item, sicut anima se habet ad corpus ut vita ipsius, ita se habet Deus ad animam, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed anima non vivificat corpus per aliquam formam mediam. Ergo nec spiritus sanctus animam per habitum medium.

Praeterea, esse gratiae immediatius est a Deo et propinquius, quam esse naturae. Sed Deus in creatione non est usus aliquo medio, quando naturam instituit. Ergo nec in recreatione, quando gratiam infundit.

Hoc etiam ostenditur ex dignitate caritatis. Omnis enim creatura est vanitas. Si ergo caritas est creatura, vanitas erit. Sed vanitas non conjungit veritati, nec confirmat in veritate. Ergo caritas non conjungeret nos Deo; quod falsum est.

Praeterea, nullum finitum est virtutis infinitae: cum virtus fluat ab essentia. Sed omnis creatura finita est. Ergo nullius creaturae virtus infinita est. Sed virtus caritatis infinita est, quia movet per infinitam distantiam; conjungit enim creaturam creatori, et facit de peccatore justum. Ergo videtur quod non sit creatura.

Item, nulla creatura est dignior quam anima Christi. Sed caritas est dignior quam anima Christi; quia ipsa caritate anima Christi bona est. Ergo caritas non est creatura.

Praeterea, majori bono debetur major amor. Sed Deus est infinitum bonum, et infinita fecit pro nobis. Igitur debemus sibi infinitum amorem. Sed amor quo diligimus Deum, est caritas. Ergo caritas est quid infinitum. Ergo non est creatura.

Praeterea, omne creatum est in praedicamento aliquo. Sed quidquid continetur in decem generibus, est aliqua natura. Si ergo caritas sit quid creatum, erit natura quaedam. Sed natura adveniens naturae non facit nisi naturam. Ergo anima habens caritatem, si caritas sit quid creatum, non habebit nisi esse naturae. Sed per caritatem potest mereri. Ergo natura aliqua per se poterit in actus meritorios; quod est haeresis Pelagiana. Videtur ergo quod caritas non sit quid creatum.

Contra, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sed amor increatus, qui est spiritus sanctus, participatur in creatura. Ergo secundum modum ipsius creaturae. Sed modus ejus est finitus. Ergo oportet quod recipiatur in creatura aliquis amor finitus. Sed omne finitum est creatum. Ergo in anima habente spiritum sanctum, est aliqua caritas creata.

Item, omnis assimilatio fit per formam aliquam. Sed per caritatem efficimur conformes ipsi Deo; qua amissa, dicitur anima deformari. Ergo videtur quod caritas sit quaedam forma creata manens in anima.

Praeterea constat quod Deus aliquo modo est in sanctis quo non est in creaturis. Sed ista diversitas non potest poni ex parte ipsius Dei, qui eodem modo se habet ad omnia. Ergo videtur quod sit ex parte creaturae, scilicet quod ipsa creatura habeat aliquid quod alia non habent. Aut ergo habet ipsum divinum esse; et sic omnes justi assumerentur a spiritu sancto in unitatem personae, sicut natura humana assumpta est a Christo in unitatem personae ipsius filii Dei: quod non potest esse. Aut oportet quod illa creatura, in qua speciali modo Deus esse dicitur, habeat in se aliquem effectum Dei, quem alia non habent. Iste autem effectus non potest esse tantum actus; quia sic in justis dormientibus non esset alio modo quam in aliis creaturis. Ergo oportet quod sit aliquis habitus. Oportet igitur aliquem habitum caritatis creatum esse in anima, secundum quem spiritus sanctus ipsam inhabitare dicitur.

Respondeo dicendum, quod tota bonitas ipsius animae est ex caritate: unde quantum bona est tantum habet de caritate; et si caritatem non habeat, nihil est, sicut dicitur 1 Corinth., 13. Constat autem quod per caritatem anima non habet minus de bonitate in esse gratiae, quam per virtutem acquisitam in esse politico. Virtus autem politica duo facit: quia facit bonum habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit. Multo fortius igitur hoc facit caritas. Neutrum autem horum effici poterit, nisi caritas sit habitus creatus. Constat enim quod omne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, sicut esse album ab albedine, et esse substantiale a forma substantiali. Sicut igitur non potest intelligi quod paries sit albus sine albedine inhaerente; ita non potest intelligi quod anima sit bona in esse gratuito sine caritate et gratia informante ipsam. Similiter etiam, cum actus proportionetur potentiae operativae sicut effectus propriae causae, impossibile est intelligere quod actus perfectus in bonitate sit a potentia non perfecta per habitum; sicut etiam calefacere non potest esse ab igne nisi mediante calore. Et ideo cum actus caritatis perfectionem quamdam habeat ex hoc quod est meritorius omnibus modis, oportet ponere, caritatem esse habitum creatum in anima; quae quidem efficienter est a tota Trinitate, sed exemplariter manat ab amore, qui est spiritus sanctus: et ideo frequenter invenitur quod spiritus sanctus sit amor quo diligimus Deum et proximum, sicut etiam dicitur a Dionysio, quod esse divinum est esse omnium rerum, inquantum scilicet ab eo omne esse exemplariter deducitur. Magister tamen vult quod caritas non sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima; sed quod sit tantum actus qui est ex libero arbitrio moto per spiritum sanctum, quem caritatem dicit. Ad cujus explanationem, quidam dixerunt, quod sicut lux dupliciter potest considerari, vel prout est in se, et sic dicitur lux; vel prout est in extremitate diaphani terminati, et sic lux dicitur color (quia hypostasis coloris est lux, et color nihil aliud est quam lux incorporata); ita dicunt, quod spiritus sanctus, prout in se consideratur, spiritus sanctus et Deus dicitur; sed prout consideratur ut existens in anima, quam movet ad actum caritatis, dicitur caritas. Dicunt enim, quod sicut filius univit sibi naturam humanam solus, quamvis sit ibi operatio totius Trinitatis; ita spiritus sanctus solus unit sibi voluntatem, quamvis ibi sit operatio totius Trinitatis. Sed hoc non potest stare; quia unio humanae naturae in Christo terminata est ad unum esse personae divinae: et ideo idem actus numero est personae divinae et naturae humanae assumptae. Sed voluntas alicujus sancti non assumitur in unitatem suppositi spiritus sancti. Unde cum operatio a supposito unitatem habeat et diversitatem; non potest esse quod intelligatur esse una operatio voluntatis et spiritus sancti, nisi per modum quo Deus operatur in qualibet re. Sed iste modus non sufficit ad operationis perfectionem; quia operatio consequitur conditiones causae proximae in necessitate et contingentia et perfectione et hujusmodi, et non primae causae. Unde non est intelligere quod sit operatio perfecta voluntatis per quam uniatur spiritui sancto, nisi sit ibi habitus perficiens potentiam operativam: nec potest esse similitudo actus voluntatis ad spiritum sanctum, nisi sit similitudo spiritus sancti in anima per aliquam formam, quae est principium actus quo spiritui sancto conformetur; quia actus ad hoc non sufficit, ut dictum est.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in gratificatione animae est considerare duplicem operationem spiritus sancti. Unam, quae terminatur ad esse secundum actum primum qui est esse gratum in habendo habitum caritatis. Aliam, secundum quam operatur actum secundum, qui est operatio movens voluntatem in opus dilectionis: et utroque modo oportet incidere medium non propter indigentiam vel defectum ipsius spiritus operantis, sed propter necessitatem animae recipientis; sed diversimode. Quia quo ad primum effectum, qui est esse gratiae, caritas est medium per modum causae formalis: quia nullum esse potest recipi in creatura, nisi per aliquam formam. Ad effectum autem secundum, qui est operatio, est medium caritas in ratione causae efficientis secundum quod virtutem quae est principium operandi reducimus in causam agentem: quia etiam non est possibile aliquam operationem perfectam a creatura exire, nisi principium illius operationis sit perfectio potentiae operantis, prout dicimus habitum elicientem actum esse principium ejus.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod anima comparatur ad corpus non tantum ut causa agens, secundum quod est motrix corporis, sed etiam ut forma; unde formaliter seipsa facit vivere corpus, secundum quod vivere dicitur esse viventium. Deus autem non est forma ipsius animae vel voluntatis, qua formaliter vivere possit; sed dicitur vita animae sicut principium exemplariter influens vitam gratiae ipsi. Similiter dicendum de luce, quod lux potest dupliciter considerari. Vel prout est in ipso corpore lucido; et sic se habet ad illuminationem aeris ut principium efficiens, nec illuminat nisi per formam luminis influxam ipsi diaphano illuminato: vel prout est in diaphano illuminato; et sic est forma ipsius, qua formaliter est lucidum. Deus autem dicitur esse illuminans lux per modum lucis quae est in ipso corpore lucenti per se, et non per modum quo illuminatum formaliter illuminatur a forma lucis in ipso recepta. Sed illi lumini recepto assimilatur caritas vel gratia recepta in anima.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnino simile est de creatione et recreatione. Sicut enim Deus per creationem contulit rebus esse naturae, et illud esse est formaliter a forma recepta in ipsa re creata, quae est quasi terminus operationis ipsius agentis; et iterum forma illa est principium operationum naturalium, quas Deus in rebus operatur: ita etiam et in recreatione Deus confert animae esse gratiae; et principium formale illius esse est habitus creatus, quo etiam perficitur operatio meritoria quam Deus in nobis operatur; et ita iste habitus creatus partim se habet ad operationem spiritus sancti ut terminus, et partim ut medium.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod caritas, inquantum est ex nihilo, habet quod sit vanitas; sed inquantum procedit a Deo ut similitudo ipsius, non habet rationem vanitatis, immo conjungendi ipsi Deo.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur facere dupliciter: vel per modum efficientis, sicut pictor facit parietem album; vel per modum formae, sicut albedo facit album. Facere igitur de peccatore justum vel Deo conjunctum, est ipsius Dei sicut efficientis, et ipsius caritatis sicut formae. Unde non potest concludi quod caritas sit virtutis infinitae, sed solum quod est effectus virtutis infinitae.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod nobilitas aliquorum potest attendi dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Videtur autem simpliciter dignius esse quod secundum suum esse nobilius est, et hoc modo anima Christi et anima cujuscumque justi est nobilior quam caritas creata, quae habet esse accidentis. Videtur etiam aliquid dignius secundum quid, quod secundum aliquod dignius est; et hoc modo caritas creata est nobilior quam anima Christi. In quolibet enim genere actus est nobilior quam potentia, quantum ad illud genus. Unde sicut albedo corporis Christi quantum ad hoc esse quod est esse album, est nobilior quam sit corpus Christi; ita etiam scientia ejus creata est nobilior quam anima ejus quantum ad hoc quod est esse scientem, quod est esse secundum quid. Et similiter caritas quantum ad tale esse: quia se habet in esse illo ad animam Christi, sicut actus ad potentiam.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum, nunquam in quibusdam amicitiis contingit aequivalens reddere: sed sufficit ad aequitatem amicitiae illud quod est possibile reddi; sicut filius nunquam potest patri carnali reddere aliquid aequivalens ei quod ab ipso accepit, scilicet esse et doctrinam et nutrimentum. Multo minus divinis beneficiis et bonitati suae possumus reddere amorem aequivalentem. Unde non sequitur quod amor quo Deum diligimus, sit infinitus quantum ad substantiam actus; sed infinitatem habet ex hoc quod objectum amoris omnibus aliis praeponitur: sed sufficit quod amemus cum amore commensurato nobis.

Ad ultimum dicendum, quod natura dicitur multipliciter, secundum Boetium: dicitur enim uno modo natura omne quod est, vel substantia vel accidens; et hoc modo gratia est natura quaedam. Alio modo dicitur natura quod est principium motus et quietis ipsius in quo est, unde illud dicitur esse naturale vel quod causatur a principiis naturalibus, vel causari potest; et hoc modo caritas non est natura, quia per principia naturalia creaturae non potest causari; et secundum hunc modum dicit Pelagius, per naturalia sola hominem posse in actus meritorios.

Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis I d.17 q.1 a.1 (Parma vol. VI, 1856, archive.org sanctithomaeaqu06thom; text located via Corpus Thomisticum) · pd

Notes

Thomas's own commentary on this distinction, written at Paris within two years of Bonaventure's. Eight objections all argue the Master's side, three sed contra answer them, and the corpus names him: Magister tamen vult quod caritas non sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima. The corpus then reports an anonymous defence of the Master (quidam dixerunt) built on the analogy of light and colour and on the Incarnation, and rejects it — the same defence, with the same Christological parallel, that Bonaventure's scholion reports and rejects. Latin verified segment by segment against the page's own anchor index, and ⭐ confirmed against Parma vol. VI (1856) 2026-09-06 — see raw/thomas/verification/PARMA-LEONINE-VERIFICATION.md.

A created habit

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