Denys the Carthusian

Dionysius Cartusianus, Commentaria in I Sententiarum, d. XVII q. 6; Opera omnia, t. 20 (Tournai, 1902)

Datec. 1460PlaceRoermondBench / bandthomistDistinctionI d.17 · cap. 5 · q.6

English

One charity is called greater than another in five ways. First, by the greatness of its subject, as the whiteness of a horse is greater than the whiteness of a pearl. Second, by greatness of duration, as the colour of the phoenix is greater than that of the swan. Third, intensively, as the whiteness of snow is greater than that of stone. Fourth, according to efficacy in meriting: so the charity of a heroic man is greater than that of a small one. Fifth, in dignity, as a theological virtue is greater than a moral one.

In the first way one charity is not greater than another, because every charity is in an indivisible subject. Whether in the second way is doubtful, since it seems that it is, given that one act of love lasts longer than another. But it is objected that the act and motion of charity seems to be instantaneous. And it must be answered that it does last longer, because it at least coexists with time. It is agreed too that in the third, fourth and fifth ways one charity is greater than another, since one is more intense, more efficacious and more perfect than another.

On the intensification of charity there are two opinions. One, that it does not remain the same in number when it is increased — which is false, and against the Apostle's word: charity never falls away. It is asked, then, according to what the augmentation or intensification of charity is measured. To which it is commonly said: according to the greatest motion of charity, that is, according as it approaches its greatest act, or according as it can proceed to a greater motion. Which is to be understood of measuring by effect and sign, not of measuring by cause, since charity is the cause of the acts and motions […]

At length, in this matter, the position of Thomas seems to be the more reasonable, because of the considerations advanced on both sides. Yet in this matter Richard followed Bonaventure's opinion, holding that charity is increased by the addition of charity, and that from those various degrees or charities one more perfect charity comes to be. […] Nevertheless Bonaventure, Peter and Richard speak here soberly, and by way of opinion rather than assertion.

Draft English (Claude), awaiting Wilson · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com. This page quotes it; that is its home.

Latin

Caritas una dicitur major alia quinque modis. Primo, majoritate subjecti: sicut albedo equi major est albedine margaritae. Secundo, majoritate durationis: sicut major est color phoenicis quam cycni. Tertio, intensive: ut major est albedo nivis quam saxi. Quarto, secundum efficaciam promerendi: sic major est caritas viri heroici quam pusilli. Quinto, dignitate: sicut virtus theologica est major virtute morali.

Primo modo una caritas non est alia major, quia omnis caritas indivisibili inest subjecto. An autem secundo modo, est dubium: quia videtur quod imo, quum una dilectio sit diuturnior alia. Sed objicitur, quoniam actus et motus caritatis videtur instantaneus esse. Et respondendum, quod diuturnior est, quia ad minus tempori coexsistit. Constat quoque quod tertio, quarto et quinto modis caritas una sit major quam alia, quum una sit intensior, efficacior atque perfectior alia.

De intensione autem caritatis est duplex opinio. Una, quod non maneat eadem numero quando augetur: quod falsum est et contra illud Apostoli: Caritas nunquam excidit. Quaeritur ergo, secundum quid attendatur augmentum seu intensio caritatis. Ad quod communiter dicitur, quod secundum maximum motum caritatis, videlicet secundum quod maximo ejus actui propinquatur, vel secundum quod in majorem potest motum procedere. Quod intelligendum est de attentione per effectum et signum, non de attentione per causam, quum caritas causa sit actuum motuumque […]

Videtur demum in hac materia positio Thomae rationabilior esse, propter motiva hinc inde praehabita. Tamen in hac re Richardus opinionem Bonaventurae secutus est, tenens caritatem augeri per caritatis additionem, et quod ex diversis gradibus seu caritatibus illis fiat una perfectior. […] Verumtamen Bonaventura, Petrus, Richardus, loquuntur hic sobrie et opinative magis quam assertive.

Dionysius Cartusianus, Commentaria in I Sententiarum, d. XVII q. 6; Opera omnia, t. 20 (Tournai, 1902) · pd

Notes

⭐ The last full commentary on the Sentences reaches this question and finds nine men already on it — Peter of Tarentaise, Albert, Giles of Rome, Durandus, Henry of Ghent, Scotus, Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Thomas — quotes each, and then chooses: videtur demum in hac materia positio Thomae rationabilior esse. Two centuries of argument, and the verdict is given in a comparative, propter motiva hinc inde praehabita. ⭐ What he adds himself is the most useful thing on the page for a reader who has lost the thread: five distinct senses in which one charity is greater than another — by its subject, by duration, intensively, by efficacy in meriting, and in dignity — with the observation that the dispute concerns only the third. Much of the fourteenth-century argument on this crux is two men using the word in two of these senses. ⭐ And he is careful where the others are not: the measure of increase is taken by effect and sign, not by cause, since charity is the cause of the acts by which we would measure it. ⚠ He also notes that Bonaventure, Peter and Richard speak here sobrie et opinative magis quam assertive — soberly and as opinion rather than assertion — which is a judgment about the temperature of the dispute that no other witness on this page makes.

Threads

→ transmits · Albert the Great
The second time on this edition that Denys quotes Albert and both ends are on the page, and this one is close to verbatim. Borgnet's Albert: Dicendum, quod haec quaestio una est et ejusdem rationis in augmento omnium virtutum: concedo autem simpliciter, quod augetur charitas per additionem essentiae ad essentiam. Denys: Porro Albertus de tanta difficultate modicum scribit: Haec (dicens) quaestio una est et rationis ejusdem in augmento omnium virtutum. Et concedo simpliciter quod caritas augetur per additionem essentiae ad essentiam. ⭐ Two prints, 1893 and 1902, of a thirteenth-century text and a fifteenth-century quotation of it, agreeing to the word order. That is an independent check on the Borgnet text, and this edition has very few.
→ cites · Thomas Aquinas
Denys weighs nine men and decides for one: Videtur demum in hac materia positio Thomae rationabilior esse, propter motiva hinc inde praehabita. ⚠ The article he is choosing is the position, not necessarily this text — he cites Thomas across the Scriptum and the Summa throughout the question — and the thread is drawn to the Thomas note this page carries.
← contests · Durandus of Saint-Pourçain
Denys prints him in order to weigh him and then decides against him, for Thomas. Durandus holds that what is called augmentation here is more an alteration than an augmentation, and that the degrees of a form are measured by its essence and not by its being — refusing the second because it presupposes a real distinction between being and essence that he will not grant.