Sententiae

Bonaventure

S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia, Tomus I (Quaracchi, 1882), pp. 308–310, Book I, Dist. XVII, Pars 2, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio I

Datec. 1252PlaceParisBench / bandfranciscanDistinctionI d.17 · cap. 5 · p2-a1-q1
Can charity increase

English

As to the first [question], it is shown that charity can be augmented according to substance:

1. By Augustine to Boniface: «Charity merits to be augmented, that, having been augmented, it may merit to be perfected».

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason: the charity of the way is according to substance lesser than the charity of the homeland; but from the charity of the way it happens that one comes to the charity of the homeland, the same being preserved in being, since the charity of the way never falls away; but motion from a lesser to a greater, with the thing preserved, is augmentation: therefore it happens that charity is augmented.

3. Likewise, it is established that to different [persons] greater and lesser rewards are given; whence the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 15: One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon etc.; and it is established that to one and the same [person] according to different states a different reward — namely greater and lesser — is owed; but the magnitude of the substantial reward corresponds to the quantity of charity, not according to fervor, but according to substance: therefore if it happens that a greater reward is owed to someone, then also that charity is augmented substantially.

4. Likewise, it happens that charity is bettered, since it is not the highest good; but charity is good substantially: therefore it happens that charity becomes better according to its own substance. But, as Augustine says in the sixth book On the Trinity, chapter eight: «In spiritual things the same thing is greater and better»: therefore, since charity is something spiritual, it is possible that it itself be made greater according to substance.

5. Likewise, it is established that in one and the same [subject] charity can [tend] to a greater effect and act: therefore, since the greaterness of the effect comes from the magnitude of the virtue [or power], it is possible that charity be made greater according to virtue. Then I ask: either charity is its own virtue, or not: if so, then with the virtue augmented, it is necessary that the essence of charity be augmented; if not, then I ask about that virtue: either it has an essence, or not; if so, similarly I ask about it: therefore there will either be a regress to infinity, or it is necessary to posit that something is augmented according to substance; but for whatever reason another virtue [is so augmented], so also is charity.

On the contrary: 1. Charity is a form; but every form consists in an invariable essence: therefore so does charity also; but nothing invariable according to essence is augmented according to essence: therefore neither is charity.

2. Likewise, where there is augmentation, there is greater and lesser; but where there is simplicity, there is no greater and lesser: if therefore charity is a simple form and not extended, in charity there will be no augmentation.

3. Likewise, augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, and not according to substance: therefore by parity of reasoning so also in spiritual things: therefore if charity is augmented, this is only according to accident, not according to substance.

4. Likewise, what is augmented is changed, and what is augmented according to substance is changed according to substance; but what is substantially changed is other now than before: therefore what is augmented according to substance does not remain: if then charity never falls away except through sin, but always remains, therefore it is not augmented.

Conclusio. Charity can be augmented according to substance, that is, according to the quantity of virtue.

Respondeo: It must be said that according to the common opinion it is true that charity is augmented substantially.

For the understanding of the objections, however, certain people distinguish augmentation according to a twofold difference. For augmentation occurs when greater succeeds lesser; this, however, can be in two ways: either thus, that the very same thing which earlier was lesser, afterward becomes greater, as a man is said to be augmented, or any other quantum, and in this mode charity is not augmented, as they say; or in the sense that greater succeeds lesser, not the same in number, but similar in form, as the days are said to be augmented — not because the same day is first lesser and afterward greater, but because greater succeeds lesser; and thus they say charity is augmented, and through this they can evade the objections.

But this position, as has been proved above, cannot stand. For it has been shown that, with charity remaining the same, it happens that increase and perfection occur with respect to the same.

And therefore it must rather be said that augmentation follows quantity. But quantity is said in two ways, namely properly and metaphorically: properly the quantity of mass is so called, and this is in bodily things; metaphorically the quantity of virtue, and this is in spiritual things. Likewise also augmentation is said in two ways: properly, namely according to magnitude of mass, and metaphorically according to quantity of virtue. Since therefore in charity there is quantity of virtue, and not at the highest [degree], it is constant that charity can be augmented. Again, since virtue is the same as the substance of charity, and the quantity of virtue is [there], hence it is that of necessity it follows that charity is augmented according to substance; for since it is a virtue, its substance is not other than the virtue.

1. To that which therefore is objected to the contrary, that the essence of a form is invariable; it must be said that this is true of a universal form; but if it be said of a singular form, it is true considered in itself, but not as it is in another.

2. To that which is objected, that simplicity does not admit magnitude; it must be said that this is true: it does not admit magnitude of mass, but it does admit magnitude of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, the response is plain. For quantity of mass is an accident, essentially differing from the [thing] quantified; but it is not so in things quantified by quantity of virtue — rather, the quantity of virtue is essential, as has been proved in the objection.

It can however be said that when it is said that the motion of augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, this [word] according to can be taken in two ways: either as expressing the relation of the term per se, or of the formal term — and thus indeed the term of augmentation is the perfected quantity; or in such a way that it expresses the term per accidens, and in this mode augmentation per accidens regards substance. Which is plain. For when a greater quantity is added to a lesser, unless this happens through rarefaction or through extension, it is necessary that substance be added, in which that quantity may be; and so augmentation has more of substance, and so consequently it terminates at substance even in bodily things.

4. And through this is plain what is objected: that what is changed according to substance is one thing and another; this is true, if it expresses the formal term; but it does not so express it.

To that which is objected: that what is augmented according to substance is also changed according to substance; it must be said, since for a thing there is not only substantial being, but also perfect being. To be changed therefore according to substance can be in two ways: either with respect to being simply, and thus the changed thing is one thing and another; or with respect to perfect being, and thus it is the same, because when from imperfect there comes-to-be perfect, it is not another, but the same. Hence it is that charity, although it is substantially augmented, is not other, but the same according to substance; whence the objection has no force.

Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com (Bonaventure edition (bonaventure.wrootpress.com)). This page quotes it; that is its home.

Latin

Quantum ad primum ostenditur, quod caritas possit augeri secundum substantiam:

1. Per Augustinum ad Bonifacium: «Caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: caritas viae secundum substantiam minor est caritate patriae; sed a caritate viae ad caritatem patriae contingit devenire, ipsa salvata in esse, quoniam caritas viae numquam excidit; sed motus a minori ad maius, re salva, est augmentum: ergo contingit caritatem augmentari.

3. Item, constat, quod diversis maiora et minora praemia tribuuntur; unde Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto: Alia claritas solis, alia claritas lunae etc.; et constat, quod uni et eidem secundum diversos status debetur diversum praemium, scilicet maius et minus; sed magnitudo praemii substantialis respondet quantitati caritatis, non secundum fervorem, sed secundum substantiam: ergo si contingit, maius praemium alicui deberi, ergo et caritatem substantialiter augeri.

4. Item, contingit caritatem meliorari, cum non sit summum bonum; sed caritas est bona substantialiter: ergo contingit, caritatem secundum suam substantiam fieri meliorem. Sed ut dicit Augustinus in sexto de Trinitate, octavo capitulo: «In spiritualibus idem est maius et melius»: ergo cum caritas sit quid spirituale, possibile est, secundum substantiam ipsam effici maiorem.

5. Item, constat quod in uno et eodem caritas potest in maiorem effectum et actum: ergo cum maioritas effectus veniat a magnitudine virtutis, possibile est, caritatem maiorem effici secundum virtutem. Tunc quaero: aut caritas est sua virtus, aut non: si sic: ergo augmentata virtute, necesse est, augeri essentiam caritatis; si non, tunc quaero de illa virtute: aut habet essentiam, aut non; si sic, similiter quaero de illa: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel necesse est poni, quod aliquid augeatur secundum substantiam; sed qua ratione alia virtus, et caritas.

Sed contra: 1. Caritas est forma; sed omnis forma consistit in essentia invariabili: ergo et caritas; sed nihil invariabile secundum essentiam augetur secundum essentiam: ergo nec caritas.

2. Item, ubi augmentum, ibi maius et minus; sed ubi est simplicitas, ibi non est maius et minus: si ergo caritas est forma simplex et non extensa, in caritate non erit augmentum.

3. Item, augmentum in corporalibus est secundum accidens, et non secundum substantiam: ergo pari ratione et in spiritualibus: ergo si caritas augetur, hoc est solum secundum accidens, non secundum substantiam.

4. Item, quod augetur mutatur, et quod augetur secundum substantiam mutatur secundum substantiam; sed quod substantialiter mutatur est aliud nunc quam prius: ergo quod augetur secundum substantiam non manet: si ergo caritas numquam excidit nisi per peccatum, sed semper manet, ergo non augetur.

Conclusio. Caritas secundum substantiam sive secundum quantitatem virtutis augeri potest.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem verum est, caritatem substantialiter augeri.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum distinguunt quidam augmentum secundum duplicem differentiam. Augmentum enim est, quando minori succedit maius; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel ita, quod illud idem, quod prius fuit minus, postea fiat maius, sicut homo dicitur augeri vel aliquod aliud quantum, et hoc modo caritas non augetur, ut dicunt; vel ideo, quod minori succedat maius, non idem numero, sed consimile in forma, sicut dies dicuntur augeri, non quia idem dies primo sit minor et postea maior, sed quia minori succedit maior; sic dicunt augeri caritatem, ac per hoc posse evadere oppositiones.

Sed positio ista, ut supra probatum est, non potest stare. Ostensum est enim, quod caritate manente eadem, contingit, circa eandem fieri crementum et perfectionem.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et metaphorice: proprie dicitur quantitas molis, et haec est in corporalibus; metaphorice quantitas virtutis, et haec est in spiritualibus. Sic et augmentum dicitur dupliciter: proprie, scilicet secundum magnitudinem molis, et metaphorice secundum quantitatem virtutis. Cum ergo in caritate sit quantitas virtutis, et non in summo, constans est, caritatem augeri posse. Rursus, cum virtus sit idem quod substantia caritatis, et sit quantitas virtutis, hinc est, quod de necessitate sequitur, caritatem augeri secundum substantiam; cum enim sit virtus, eius substantia non est alia a virtute.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod essentia formae est invariabilis; dicendum, quod verum est de forma universali; si autem dicatur de forma singulari, verum est in se considerata, sed non prout in alio.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicitas non admittit magnitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non admittit magnitudinem molis, admittit tamen magnitudinem virtutis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentum in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, patet responsio. Nam quantitas molis est accidens, essentialiter differens a quanto; non autem sic est in quantis quantitate virtutis, immo quantitas virtutis essentialis est, ut in opponendo probatum est.

Potest tamen dici, quod cum dicitur, quod motus augmenti in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, dupliciter potest accipi hoc quod est secundum: aut quod dicat habitudinem termini per se sive termini formalis, et sic utique terminus augmenti est quantitas perfecta; aut ita, quod dicat terminum per accidens, et hoc modo augmentum per accidens respicit substantiam. Quod patet. Cum enim additur quantitas maior minori, nisi fiat per rarefactionem vel per protensionem, oportet quod addatur substantia, in qua sit illa quantitas; et ita augmentum plus habet de substantia, et ita per consequens ad substantiam terminatur etiam in corporalibus.

4. Et per hoc patet quod obiicitur: quod mutatur secundum substantiam est aliud et aliud; verum est, si dicat terminum formalem; sed non sic dicit.

Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod augmentatur secundum substantiam et mutatur secundum substantiam; dicendum, quia rei non tantum est esse substantiale, sed etiam perfectum esse. Mutari ergo secundum substantiam hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu esse simpliciter, et sic mutatum est aliud et aliud; vel respectu esse perfecti, et sic est idem, quia cum de imperfecto fit perfectum, non est aliud, sed idem. Hinc est, quod caritas, quamvis substantialiter augeatur, non est alia, sed eadem secundum substantiam; unde non valet obiectio.

S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia, Tomus I (Quaracchi, 1882), pp. 308–310, Book I, Dist. XVII, Pars 2, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio I · pd

Notes

Bonaventure treats the increase question in the second part of the distinction, where Quaracchi prints Lombard's defence of his own opinion. The question is put as whether charity can be augmented according to substance — that is, in its own being, and not merely in the way the Master allowed.

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