S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia, Tomus I (Quaracchi, 1882), pp. 296–298, Book I, Dist. XVII, Pars 1, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio II
Secondly it is asked, whether charity is lovable out of charity; and that it is, is shown in this manner.
1. Augustine, in book eight On the Trinity: «Let no one say: I do not know what I love: let him love his brother and he loves love itself»: therefore love is to be loved; therefore etc.
2. Likewise, this same point seems to follow by reason, since there is no perfect knowledge except that by which one knows that he knows or knows knowledge itself; therefore neither is there perfect love except that by which one loves that he loves or love itself; but charity is the perfect love: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, someone loves his neighbor, and rightly, because he sees that he has charity; but «that on account of which a thing is so, that thing is so the more»: therefore he ought the more to love charity or love.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine in book one On Christian Doctrine says that there are only four things to be loved out of charity, namely God, oneself, one's neighbor, and one's own body; but charity or love is none of these: therefore it is not to be loved out of charity.
2. Likewise, love is twofold, namely of concupiscence and of friendship; if therefore charity or love is loved, it is loved either with the love of concupiscence or with that of friendship. Not with that of friendship; for it is plain that friendship is between equals and is the love by which someone wishes another's good; but no one wishes a good for charity. Likewise, neither with that of concupiscence; for concupiscence is of a thing not possessed: therefore since out of charity no one loves except one having charity, therefore out of charity one cannot have concupiscence for charity. — If you say that one has concupiscence for the increase of charity, this does not solve it, because I am not asking anything except whether charity, when possessed, can, insofar as it is possessed, be loved.
3. Likewise, as faith is to believing, and hope to the act of hoping, so love or charity is to the act of loving; but no one having faith believes faith or believes in faith; for, as Augustine says: «The believer knows that he believes, and sees that he believes»; but credulity is of things not seen; likewise no one hopes for hope itself: therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither does anyone love charity; or, if it is not parallel, the question is asked: why not?
4. Likewise, if the lover loves love, either it is the same love or another. If another, then by parity of reasoning he loves that other love by yet another; and so it will be a regress to infinity. If, then, one must stop somewhere and it is impossible to go to infinity, if he loves, he loves with the same love. But if this is so; on the contrary: no special form is reflected upon itself except those of the first intentions, such as unity, truth, goodness; whence whiteness is in no way called white: therefore neither is love loved. And so on.
Conclusio. Created charity is to be loved not with the love of friendship, but with the love both of concupiscence and of complacency.
I respond: It must be said that, taking love insofar as God is love, it is certain that it is to be loved out of charity. But taking love insofar as it is a gratuitous habit, in this way too it is to be loved, but not above all things.
For the understanding of the objections it must be noted that love is threefold, namely of friendship, by which someone wishes a good for another; of concupiscence, by which someone desires something for himself; and of complacency, by which someone rests and takes delight in a thing desired, when it is present.
I say therefore that charity is in no way lovable with the love of friendship, because it is not capable of being beatified; with the love of concupiscence it is lovable out of charity, insofar as the lover desires to love more amply; but with the love of complacency, namely insofar as the lover accepts the very love by which he loves God, in this way charity is to be loved, insofar as it is already possessed, since it itself is a good highly to be welcomed.
To 1. With these things seen, the response to the first two is plain. For that argument from the authority of Augustine On Christian Doctrine runs only with respect to the love of friendship, since Augustine is speaking of a lovable object for which someone wishes a good.
To 2. What is objected in the second place is plain in like manner. For although there is no concupiscence of charity-already-possessed, considered as possessed, nevertheless there is complacency. — It might however also be said that spiritual love and possession excite to desiring, while they refresh, and refresh, while they excite: therefore concupiscence and complacency remain together.
To 3. To what is objected in the third place concerning faith and hope, it must be said that it is not parallel; because the act of faith of itself bespeaks an imperfection, and likewise the act of hope; for the one is of a thing not seen, the other of a thing not possessed; and therefore if such an act were reflected upon itself, it would diminish from the character of the habit; whence he who believes credulity does not have it, and likewise hope; and therefore these virtues are emptied out in the homeland. But love is an act of completion and perfection, like knowledge; whence just as he knows perfectly who knows that he knows, so he loves perfectly who loves love.
To 4. To what is objected, "either the same or another etc.": it must be said, the same as to habit, but another as to act.
And to the objection that special forms are not reflected back: it must be said that reflection in a form sometimes comes from nature; and so it is in general [forms]; sometimes it comes by reason of that in which it is; and so it is in forms which are in potencies born to be turned back upon themselves, and insofar as they are turned back upon themselves. And since the cognitive power knows itself, «and the will is an instrument moving itself», therefore through knowledge one knows oneself and one's knowledge, and through charity one loves oneself and charity itself.
And if it be asked why the intellective power is born to return upon itself, and likewise the will, this will be said elsewhere; but for the present let it suffice that they are simple powers, founded in a simple substance, and not bound to an organ; and therefore it is plain that the case which is wont to be objected is not parallel: in the senses, one power sees, and another sees that it sees: [the objection being] that the like ought to obtain in the intellect.
Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by · published at bonaventure.wrootpress.com (Bonaventure edition (bonaventure.wrootpress.com)). This page quotes it; that is its home.
S. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia, Tomus I (Quaracchi, 1882), pp. 296–298, Book I, Dist. XVII, Pars 1, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio II · pd
The second of the four questions Bonaventure's divisio announces, and the one that follows immediately on the first: having settled that charity is a created habit, he must ask whether that habit is itself among the things charity loves. Ruling 6 left this question out of the pilot until Phase 2 showed Thomas answers it too.