Before the disputeAlexander of Hales · Albert · Fishacre · Kilwardby
Empty on this page. Albert the Great stands in this band on the other cruxes of this edition, but he does not take up this question in his commentary on the distinction. Alexander of Hales, who would otherwise be here, cannot be printed at all: his Glossa was first published in 1951 and is in copyright, with no earlier edition to fall back to. Fishacre and Kilwardby are unread. Nothing here is a claim that these masters were silent.
ThomistThomas · Tarentaise · Capreolus · Denys
thomist · c. 1254 · Paris
One proceeds thus to the second point. It seems that charity is not an accident. For no accident extends beyond its subject. But charity extends beyond its subject, since by charity we love others also. Therefore it seems that charity is not an accident.
Again, every accident is caused by a substance; because, according to Avicenna, a subject is what is complete in itself and affords another the occasion of being. But charity is not caused by the principles of the soul in which it is. Therefore it seems it is not an accident.
Further, no accident is better and nobler than its subject. But charity is better than the soul. Therefore it is not in the soul as an accident in a subject. Proof of the middle: that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so. But the soul is good on account of charity. Therefore charity is better.
Again, the agent is always more honourable than the patient, according to the Philosopher. But charity acts upon the soul, cleansing it from sins. Therefore it is more honourable than the soul; and so the same as before.
On the contrary: whatever can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident. Charity is of this kind. Therefore, and so on.
I answer that everything which comes to a thing after its being is complete comes to it accidentally — unless perhaps it is taken up into a share of that substantial being itself, as was said above at distinction 8, question 5, article 2, concerning the soul. But this is still not enough for it to be called an accident in itself: for something can be a substance in itself and yet come to another accidentally, as clothing does. But if it comes after complete being as an inhering form, it is necessarily an accident. And because charity comes to the soul after its natural being, as a form perfecting it unto the being of grace — as was said in the preceding article — it must therefore be an accident.
To the first, then, it must be said that one and the same accident in number is never extended beyond its subject, that is, so as to be in another as in a subject; but it is indeed extended outside its subject as to the object of its operation — though differently in active and in passive operation. For in active operation it is extended to an extrinsic object, impressing a likeness of its own form upon it, as is clear in that the heat of fire actively heats another body, and that is an active operation. Likewise also when the operation is passive, it is extended to another extrinsic object whose likeness is received in it; and thus the soul, by the habit of knowledge, knows things that are outside itself, and by the habit of love loves those same things.
To the second it must be said that a subject stands differently to different accidents. Some are natural accidents, created out of the principles of the subject; and this in two ways, for either they are caused out of the principles of the species — and so are proper attributes, which follow upon the whole species — or out of the principles of the individual, and so are common properties following upon the natural principles of the individual. There are also certain accidents induced by violence, like heat in water, and these are repugnant to the principles of the subject. But there are others which are indeed caused from outside without being repugnant to the principles of the subject, but rather perfecting them, as light in air: and charity too is in the soul in this way, from outside. Yet it should be known that for all accidents, speaking generally, the subject is in a certain way a cause, namely inasmuch as accidents are sustained in the being of the subject — though not so that all accidents are drawn out of the subject's principles.
To the third it must be said that by the same reasoning one could prove that no perfection of the soul is an accident, nor any perfection of the body: because everything perfectible has its goodness from its perfection. It must therefore be said that simply speaking the soul is better than charity, and every subject better than its accident; but in a certain respect it is the other way about. The reason is that being, according to Dionysius, is nobler than all the other things that follow upon being: whence being simply is nobler than understanding, if understanding could be understood without being. Hence that which exceeds in being is simply nobler than anything which exceeds in some one of the things consequent upon being — although in another respect it may be less noble. And because the soul, and every substance, has a nobler being than an accident has, it is therefore simply nobler. But as to some particular being, or according to some accident, an accident can be nobler, because it stands to substance as act to potency; and this consequent goodness substance has from its accidents, though not the first goodness of being.
To the fourth it must be said that charity is not said to act upon the soul after the manner of an efficient cause, but only formally; and according to what it is as a form, in respect of second being, it is nobler.
The price of the answer given in the previous article, stated without flinching: what comes to a thing after its being is complete, as an inhering form, is an accident — and charity comes to the soul as a form perfecting it unto the being of grace, ergo oportet quod sit accidens. The third objection is the one that hurts (no accident is nobler than its subject, but charity is nobler than the soul), and Thomas concedes half of it: simply speaking the soul is nobler, but in a certain respect the accident is, because it stands to substance as act to potency. ⭐ The reply to the fourth objection is the seed of everything later on this page: caritas non dicitur agere in animam per modum efficientis, sed solum formaliter. That sentence survives the Parma OCR as unreadable prose but unambiguously the same six words — ⭐ confirmed against Parma vol. VI (1856) 2026-09-06, see raw/thomas/verification/PARMA-LEONINE-VERIFICATION.md.
A created habit
Draft English (Claude), awaiting Wilson
thomist · c. 1272 · Paris
Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
Objection 2. Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deuteronomy 30:20: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
Objection 3. Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in 17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above ( I-II:6:1 ): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.
Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above ( I-II:114:4 ) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.
Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" ( Wisdom 8:1 ). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1. The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
Reply to Objection 2. God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
Reply to Objection 3. Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
Thomas returning to the question twenty years later, and the one witness on this page that cites the distinction by its number: Magister perscrutatur hanc quaestionem in XVII dist. I Lib. Sent. He is also fairer to Lombard here than the Scriptum was — he grants that the Master never meant that the motion of love is the Holy Spirit, only that it comes from him without a habit intervening, and that he said it propter excellentiam caritatis, out of regard for charity's excellence. Then he turns that regard against the thesis: hoc magis redundat in caritatis detrimentum. The English is the public-domain Dominican Fathers translation of 1920, not an in-house draft. Anchored on this distinction under the second clause of the anchor rule; it is not a Sentences commentary, but it argues this distinction's question and names it.
A created habit
English: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920
thomist · c. 1426 · Toulouse
To Gregory's first argument against the first and second conclusions, the major is denied — speaking of being dear and accepted formally, not merely extrinsically.
Then to the first proof of that antecedent I say that it is impossible for the Holy Spirit to be given to any creature unless the gift of sanctifying grace is given to it, as was shown above at distinction 14 out of St Thomas; because a created gift belongs to the very account of that giving, in the manner set out there.
And even granted that the Holy Spirit were given to a man without an infused habit, that man still would not be called accepted formally, or worthy of eternal life; because the Holy Spirit cannot be a form of the creature rendering it formally worthy — that is done by a created habit. Whence St Thomas, De veritate q. 27 a. 1 ad 1: «God, he says, gives life to the soul not as a formal cause but as an efficient cause; and so some form falls between. As a painter makes a wall white effectively, by the mediation of whiteness, whereas whiteness does so by the mediation of no form, because it makes it white formally.» — Thus he. So in the present case: the Holy Spirit makes a man worthy of eternal life effectively, but habitual grace or charity makes him worthy formally.
To the second proof of the said antecedent the antecedent is conceded, but the consequence is denied in the sense in which we are speaking — namely that someone, according to the state in which he would be without the habitual gift, would be […]
The most direct engagement anywhere in this edition: a Thomist of 1426 answering a named fourteenth-century opponent argument by argument. His whole reply turns on one distinction — the Holy Spirit makes a man worthy of eternal life EFFECTIVE, habitual grace or charity makes him worthy FORMALITER — with Thomas's painter and the white wall for an illustration. He concedes the second proof's antecedent outright and denies only its consequence. ⛔ What he stages is not on this page as its authors' own words: Gregory's three arguments and Scotus's three (which Capreolus has apud Aureolum, at second hand) are reported here, and reporting is not witnessing. Gregory stands on this page only on his own leaf.
A created habit
English: fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt
thomist · c. 1426 · Toulouse
The third conclusion is that sanctifying grace is really distinguished from charity, and from every virtue.
The holy Doctor proves this conclusion at De veritate q. 27 a. 2, thus: «For since different natures have different ends, three things are required beforehand for reaching any end in natural things: namely a nature proportioned to that end; an inclination towards that end, which is the appetite for the natural end; and motion towards the end. […]
But there is an end for which man is prepared by God that exceeds the proportion of human nature — namely eternal life, which consists in the vision of God through his essence. Hence something must also be given to man not only by which he may work towards the end, or by which his appetite may be inclined to that end, but also by which the nature of man itself may be raised to a certain dignity, according to which such an end is fitting for him; and for this, grace is given. But for inclining the affection towards this end, charity is given. And for carrying out the works by which the said end is acquired, the other virtues are given.
And therefore, just as in natural things the nature itself is one thing and the inclination of the nature, or its motion or operation, another, so too in the order of grace, grace is one thing and charity and the remaining virtues another. And that this comparison is rightly taken is clear from Dionysius in chapter 2 of the Celestial Hierarchy, where he says that no one can have a spiritual operation unless he first receive spiritual being — just as neither can he have the operation of some nature unless he first have being in that nature.» — Thus he.
The created answer, worked out into a division of labour: grace raises the nature to a dignity that makes the end fitting, charity inclines the affection to it, the other virtues carry out the works. Three gifts where the Master had one Giver. The elision […] is the long excursus on ends in natural things, kept out because the analogy is Thomas's and the division is the part that answers this crux. Latin restored from the 1900 print's OCR: repair of scanning damage, not expansion of abbreviation.
A created habit
Draft English (Claude), awaiting Wilson
I d.17
Si caritas creata est, quomodo se habet ad Spiritus sancti inhabitationem?If charity is created, what is its relation to the Spirit's indwelling?
Cap. 1 · That the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God and neighbor.
PL 192, col. 564
Cap. 2 · That fraternal love is God — neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Holy Spirit.
PL 192, col. 565
Cap. 3 · That the saying God is charity is not said by way of cause, in the way that Thou art my patience and my hope is.
PL 192, col. 565
Cap. 4 · In what way the Holy Spirit is sent or given to us.
PL 192, col. 566
Cap. 5 · Whether the Holy Spirit is increased in a person, or is more or less had or given, and whether he is given to one who has and to one who does not have.
PL 192, col. 566
Cap. 6 · That some say that the charity of God and of neighbor is not the Holy Spirit.
PL 192, col. 567
FranciscanBonaventure · R. Middleton · Scotus
Dissenting · nominalist · AugustinianDurandus · Auriol · Ockham · Gregory · Biel
dissenting · c. 1490 · Tübingen
In the present distinction the Master treats of the manner of the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit. And the sense of the text can be summarised in these conclusions.
First conclusion. The Holy Spirit is said to be given or sent to us when he makes us love God and neighbour, by which we remain in God and God in us.
Second conclusion. The Holy Spirit is the charity and the love by which we love God. Now if this is understood formally, it does not hold. If effectively, it is true — because he it is who infuses the habit of charity. If it is understood of the uncreated charity that is simply necessary for salvation and for loving God, then again it can be saved.
Third conclusion. Charity is said to be increased, even though the Holy Spirit in himself is neither increased nor diminished. See the text at greater length.
Three hundred and thirty years after Lombard, the distinction is no longer disputed but summarised — and the whole crux is settled in a subordinate clause. Biel reduces the littera to three conclusions and disposes of the second with a distinction: formaliter non tenetur, effective verum est, quia ipse infundit habitum charitatis. What Bonaventure and Thomas argued at the length of a disputed question, Biel decides in eleven words before the question proper has begun. The nearest thing on this page to the divisio's function on the Franciscan bench, and the reason it is rostered.
A created habit
English: fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt
ReceptionLuther (WA 9) · Estius (1616)
Empty. Luther's marginalia on this distinction take up what charity IS, not what the created habit leaves the Holy Spirit to do; this edition does not yet carry a reception witness on that question.
Crux 1 is a vote and this page is the bill.
Everyone who told the Master that charity is a created habit now owes an account of what the Holy Spirit is still doing in the soul, and the page shows the answers costing something. Thomas pays first and pays openly. Whatever comes to a thing after its being is complete, as an inhering form, is an accident; charity comes to the soul as a form perfecting it unto the being of grace; therefore oportet quod sit accidens. The charity that the Master had identified with God himself is, on this answer, an accident of the soul — and the third objection puts the difficulty in one line, that no accident is nobler than its subject. Thomas concedes half of it. Simply speaking the soul is nobler; in a certain respect the accident is, because it stands to substance as act to potency.
What the Spirit is left doing is settled in the reply to the fourth objection, and settled in six words: caritas non dicitur agere in animam per modum efficientis, sed solum formaliter. Charity does not act on the soul as an efficient cause but only as a form. The efficient causality is left where it was, with God.
That sentence is the whole later history of this distinction in miniature. When Capreolus has to answer Gregory of Rimini in 1426 — could God not accept a soul with no created habit at all? — his reply is that the Holy Spirit makes a man worthy of eternal life effective and habitual grace makes him worthy formaliter, illustrated with Thomas's painter, who whitens a wall by means of whiteness while whiteness whitens by means of nothing. When Biel, about 1490, wants to keep the Master's sentence from being simply false, he uses the same couple and turns it the other way: si intelligitur formaliter, non tenetur; si effective, verum est, quia ipse infundit habitum charitatis. The Master was right if you read him of efficient causality. Three benches, two and a half centuries, one distinction — and none of them cites the others for it.
Capreolus does something else the page needs, which is to say what each created gift is for. Grace raises the nature to a dignity that makes an end above its proportion fitting for it; charity inclines the affection to that end; the other virtues carry out the works by which it is reached. Where the Master had one Giver, there are now three gifts with distinct offices, and the argument for distinguishing them is an analogy from natural things, that a nature is one thing and its inclination another.
⚠ What the page cannot yet show. The dissenting bench is here only through Biel's summary of the littera; Ockham and Gregory are not asked this question in anything read so far, and Gregory's own answer would have to come from the part of his article 2 that is still unread. The band before the dispute is empty for the usual reason, and the reception band is empty because Luther's marginalia on this distinction take up what charity IS, not what the created habit leaves the Spirit to do.